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Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act as a
Model for Foreign Investment Regulation in the
United States
by Barry M. Fisher*
T raditional U.S. policy toward foreign direct investment of "neutral-
ity with encouragement" was formulated when the U.S. economy
dominated the worldwide marketplace and there existed little inward in-
vestment to offset the flow of outward capital. Although the Reagan Ad-
ministration advocates this policy by encouraging its adoption in
America's trading partners," and pursues negotiating initiatives more ag-
gressively than prior Administrations, 2 it is here suggested that substan-
tial and increasing levels of foreign direct investment in the United States
merit a policy re-thinking.3 This article analyzes the level of, and legisla-
* Of the Ontario and Ohio Bars; Associated with the law firm of Fasken & Calvin,
Toronto; LL.B., University of Western Ontario (1976); M.A., University of Toronto (1973);
B.A. (1971), B. Comm. (1970), Concordia University.
The author wishes to thank Professor Alan Ruben of Cleveland Marshall College of
Law for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I The President released a statement on Sept. 9, 1983, reiterating the U.S. policy that
foreign investment flows "which respond to private market forces will lead to more efficient
international production." To counter government intervention which it perceives to ad-
versely affect investment flows or which attempts to artificially shift the benefits of these
flows, the Reagan Administration proposes an "active international investment policy aimed
at reducing foreign government actions that impede or distort investment flows." Presi-
dent's Statement on International Investment Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214
(Sept. 12, 1983) [hereinafter cited as President's Statement]. This policy has been formu-
lated in a Statement developed by the President's Senior Interdepartmental Group in Inter-
national Economic Policy. In some ways this represents a more conciliatory and negotiation-
oriented policy directive than the Administration's U.S. Trade Policy of July 1981 to
"strictly enforce United States laws and international agreements." Legislation Authorizing
International Trade Negotiations: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1983) (quoted by David R. MacDonald, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
' The Carter Administration policy is contained in The Operations of Federal Agencies
in Monitoring, Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Operations-Part 3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1977) [herein-
after cited as The Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings]. For a history and outline of
earlier U.S. attitudes toward and regulation of foreign direct investment, see Vagts, United
States of America's Treatment of Foreign Investment, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 374 (1963).
' Oversight of U.S. Trade Policy: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance and the Subcomm. on International Finance
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) (statement of Senator Heinz):
For the first 20 years of the postwar period, the United States so dominated the
1
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tive barriers to, foreign investment in the United States and proposes
that the concept of a screening mechanism patterned after Canada's For-
eign Investment Review Act (FIRA)" should be considered among availa-
ble policy options.
I. REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding the Reagan Administration's position that the
United States accords foreign investors "the same fair, equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment it believes all governments should accord for-
eign direct investment under international law,"" the complex U.S. legal
system and extensive regulatory framework has erected a number of bar-
riers to foreign direct investment.6 In addition to the Trading with the
Enemy Act 7 and laws of general application, including taxation, securities
regulation and the acquisition of real property,' U.S. law9 restricts foreign
world economy that we could afford to lead by example. To open our markets
without regard to the short-term consequences because our domestic economy was
strong enough to absorb increased imports .... In the past decade worldwide
inflation . . .coupled with major economic strides by the [newly industrializing
countries] have significantly increased protectionist pressures. The ground we
have gained by cutting tariffs has been eroded by these new practices. These de-
velopments call for a re-examination of our policy goals.
See also Foreign Investment Legislation: Hearings on S. 329, S. 995, S. 1303, and Amend-
ment No. 393 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-42 (1975) (testimony of Professor B. Cohen).
' Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat., ch. 46 (1973-74), amended by Can. Stat.,
ch. 52 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as Can. Stat., ch. 46 (1973-74)]. For policy options and a
parallel to the Canadian investment experience, see Turner, Canadian Regulation of For-
eign Direct Investment, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 333 (1983).
5 See President's Statement, supra note 1, at 1215.
' Elmer & Johnson, Legal Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30
Bus. LAW. 681, 698 (1975). Elmer and Johnson conclude: "Occasional fevers of nationalism
and legitimate concerns for national security have created a number of restrictions and a
few bars to alien takeover and ownership of domestic corporations. In addition, poorly
drafted statutes encumbered by myriad modifications and amendments have left confusion
in several areas."
7 Ch. 106, § 1-31, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 95a, 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 1-44). The Trading with the Enemy Act serves as the basis for the Foreign Assets Control
Regulations and Transactions Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-535.904 (1982); see
The Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1982); see also The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981).
8 For a summary of such laws, see the Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra
note 2, Part 5-Appendix 9, at 139-46; see also Sparkman, The Multinational Corporation
and Foreign Investment, 27 MERCER L. REV. 381-89 (1976). With respect to antitrust, secur-
ities and tax considerations, see Young, The Acquisition of United States Businesses by
Foreign Investors, 30 Bus. LAw. 111 (1974).
9 See generally THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR Associ-
ATION, A GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 157-229 (1979) [herein-
after cited as ABA GumE] (for a review, see Atkeson, A Guide to Foreign Investment Under
United States Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 343 (1979)); FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
[Vol. 7:61
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investment in several ways: (1) outright prohibition; (2) the inability to
secure a right or privilege or withdrawal of an existing privilege; (3) the
necessity of approvals prior to action; or, (4) the imposition of require-
ments that are impossible, difficult or inconvenient for an alien to sat-
isfy.'0 These "key sector" limitations on unrestricted foreign direct in-
vestment include the regulation of communications," energy and natural
resources, 2 transportation, 3 banking,"' defense 5 and procurement. 6
LEGAL ISSUES AND TECHNIQUES (J. Marans et al. eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as J. Marans];
Bale, The U.S. Federal Government's Policy Toward Direct Investment, in FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT REGULATION IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 45-46 (Fry & Radebaugh eds.
1983); Gewanter, Legal and Financial Considerations in Acquisitions of U.S. Companies by
Foreign Investors, 34TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. INSTITUTE (1973). For a detailed analysis of foreign
investment patterns and limitations in the United States with an emphasis on real estate,
see B. ZAGARIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1980); see also Bulter, The Rise
and Fall of the U.S. Capital Controls, CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW SEMINAR 34
(1974); Hinton, United States Policy Toward Foreign Investment, id. at 34; Weiser, Re-
straints on Foreign Investments in the United States and Problems Arising from Such
Investments, id. at 42.
10 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: RE-
PORT OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TO THE CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT STUDY Acr OF 1974, at K-x to K-xi (1976) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE REPORT] ("Although there are a few marked exceptions such as insurance, states have
in general afforded aliehs, alien corporations and alien-controlled domestic corporations na-
tional treatment .... The Federal Government has pre-empted state authority and thereby
modified national treatment in selected areas"). For an interesting empirical study of the
effects of subnational units upon policies toward foreign investment, see Fry, Foreign In-
vestment in Canada and the United States: The Perspective of the Provinces and the States
(Sept. 30, 1983) (paper presented at the 7th Biennial Meeting of the Association for Cana-
dian Studies in the United States, Rockport, Maine); see also States Go for Exports,
EUROMONEY TRADE FINANCE REPORT, Jan. 1984, at 27.
, For example, the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1976) (as
amended), prohibits a station license from being granted to any foreign government or rep-
resentative thereof and § 310(b) prohibits broadcast by common foreign corporations or cor-
porations with any alien officer or directors; and, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962,
(as amended), 47 U.S.C. § 734(d) (1976), prohibits the holding of more than 20 percent of
the stock of the Communications Satellite Corporation by persons described in § 301(b). See
also 47 U.S.C. §§ 222(d), 303(1) (1976).
'2 For example, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d) (1976)
(as amended), prohibits the issuance of licenses to aliens; and, the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (as amended), provides that all valuable mineral deposits in
lands belonging to the United States shall be free and open to exploration and purchase,
and the lands in which they are found open to occupation and purchase by citizens of the
United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, and § 181 pro-
vides that citizens of a country other than the United States, the laws, customs, or regula-
tions of which deny similar or like privileges to citizens or corporations of the United States,
shall not by stock ownership, holding or control, own any interest in any lease acquired
under the Act. See also the Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §
1331 (1976); the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982)
(as amended) (prohibits foreign fishing within the "fishery conservation zone"); the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1717 (1976) (no tract of land may be
disposed of under the Act to any person who is not a citizen of the United States, or in the
case of a corporation is not subject to the laws of any State or of the United States); the
1984]
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United States policy favoring the free flow of investment capital and
trade 17 was tailored to domestic economic realities existing at the time of
its formulation. The policy dealt almost exclusively with outward capital
flow at a time when the United States exported large amounts of invest-
ment capital and faced little inward investment. As an example of U.S.
Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 797(d) (1982) (as amended) (empowers the Federal
Power Commission to issue licenses to citizens of the United States); the Natural Gas Act of
1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982) (prohibits any person from exporting any natural gas from
the United States to a foreign country or importing any natural gas from a foreign country
without having secured an order of the Federal Power Commission authorizing it to do so).
" For example, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976) (as
amended), provides that an aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if, it is
owned by a citizen or permanent resident of the United States and not registered under the
laws of a foreign country. The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1976) (as amended),
provides for the registration, enrollment and licensing of vessels by citizens of the United
States. For instance, § 835(c) prohibits during a national emergency the issuance, transfer or
assignment of indebtedness secured by a mortgage of a vessel to a non-citizen unless ap-
proved by the Secretary of Transportation; § 835(e) prohibits the vesting of control of a
corporation owning a vessel or facilities in a non-citizen; § 883 requires merchandise trans-
ported by water between points in the United States to be carried by vessels built in and
documented under U.S. laws and owned by its citizens; § 1132(a) requires all licensed of-
ficers of vessels documented under U.S. laws to be citizens; and, § 1171(a) limits financial
aid in the operation of a vessel used in an essential service in the foreign commerce to U.S.
citizens. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1982) (as amended), provides for the
licensing of citizens of the United States as customs house brokers.
14 For example, the Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (as amended), requires that
every director must, during his whole term of service, be a U.S. citizen; and a majority of the
shares of an Edge Act corporation must be owned by U.S. citizens or corporations controlled
by U.S. citizens under 12 U.S.C. § 619. See also The Operations of Federal Agencies Hear-
ings, supra note 2, Part 4-Foreign Investments in U.S. Banks.
2' The Industrial Security Program formulated by Exec. Orders No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 55
(1973), No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 83 (1973), and No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973), and Department
of Defense Regulation 5220.22-R inhibits security clearances for foreign controlled corpora-
tions required to carry out classified contracts; see also the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. App. § 2071 (1950).
1 For example, the Buy American Act of 1933, 41 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1976), provides that
unless inconsistent with the public interest or at unreasonable cost, only such unmanufac-
tured articles, materials and supplies as have been mined and produced in the United States
from such supplies shall be acquired for public use (see also 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104); the Agri-
cultural Credit Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1922, 1941 (1982) (as amended), provides that the
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to make and insure loans to farmers and ranchers
that are U.S. citizens; the Electric Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development and Demonstra-
tion Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2509(i) (1982), provides that an applicant seeking a guarantee
under the section must be a citizen or national of the United States; and, the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. § 2198(c) (1982) (as amended), defines "eligible investors" as
U.S. citizens, U.S. corporations, or foreign corporations wholly-owned by U.S. citizens.
17 This policy was set forth early in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, ch.
474, § 350, 48 Stat. 943 (1934); the Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 321, 67 Stat. 363 (1953);
and, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1982). See also the Hick-
enlooper Amendment providing for suspension of assistance to countries which take speci-
fied actions inimical to U.S. investments, Pub. L. No. 87-565, 76 Stat. 260 (1962); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e) (added in 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1012 (1964)).
[Vol. 7:61
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legislation supporting this policy, the Interest Equalization Tax Act' s im-
posed an excise tax on purchases by U.S. persons of foreign securities in
an attempt to discourage foreign use of domestic capital markets.
II. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE
LEVEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE
1970's
The level of foreign direct investment in the United States grew at
an annual rate of 4.1 percent from 1962 to 1967, 8.6 percent from 1968 to
1972, and then blossomed to 38.3 percent and 22.3 percent in 1973 and
1974 respectively.19 The primary reason for the increase was the invest-
ment potential of petrodollar reserves generated by the 1973 oil price in-
creases. The 1973 oil shock precipitated a U.S. government review of its
policy toward foreign direct investment.2 0 The concern over the signifi-
cant increase in the level of foreign direct investment in the United
States resulted in several congressional hearings2' and legislative initia-
tives. 22 The realization that the reporting base for Department of Com-
IS Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1964) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 4911 (1976)).
Ricks, The Future of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, in FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGULATION IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 179 (Fry & Radebaugh eds.
1983).
20 Mundheim & Heleniak, American Attitudes Toward Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States, 2 J. Comp. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 221 (1979); Niehus, Foreign Investment
in the United States: A Review of Government Policy, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 81 (1975).
" Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on S. 425, S.
953, S. 995, and S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); Hearings on
S. 329, S. 995, S. 1303, and Amendment No. 393 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Com-
merce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); Hear-
ings on Foreign Investment in the U.S. Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974);
Foreign Investment in the U.S.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974); Hearings on S.
3955 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1974).
2' For example, H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973) and H.R. 11,265, 93d Cong., 1st
Seas. (1974), entitled the Foreign Investors Limitation Act, would have restricted foreign
persons from acquiring more than 5 percent of the voting securities or more than 35 percent
of the non-voting securities of publicly held U.S. corporations. For a summary of the legisla-
tive proposals of the 93d Congress, see Note, U.S. Regulations of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Current Developments and Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611 (1975).
The Note concludes that while a re-examination of policy was required, there was, at the
time, no demonstrated need, based upon available information as to the extent of foreign
direct investment in the United States, for the legislation then pending in Congress. A sur-
vey of legislation proposed in the 94th Congress is set forth in Shecter, FIRA: Experience of
a U.S. Lawyer, 1976 CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 45; see also
Young, The Acquisition of United States Businesses by Foreign Investors, 30 Bus. LAW.
1984]
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merce figures from the preceding benchmark survey in 1959 were out of
date and that data on foreign investment in real estate and agricultural
facilities were almost nonexistent led to the enactment of the Foreign In-
vestment Study Act of 1974 (1974 Act).2" The 1974 Act authorized a com-
prehensive report which concluded that no adjustment in traditional U.S.
policy was needed at the time,2 ' but also recommended legislation
designed to improve data collection on a continuing basis. 25 Although
there was no perceived need for legislation to restrict foreign direct in-
vestment, a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) was established by Executive Order .2 Among the significant re-
sponsibilities of CFIUS are:
1. Providing guidance on arrangements with foreign governments
for advance ' consultations on prospective major foreign governmental in-
vestments in the United States, and
2. The review of investments in the United States, which in the
judgment of CFIUS might have major implications for United States na-
tional interests.2 7
Relying on the 1974 Act report recommendations, Congress subse-
quently enacted the International Investment Survey Act of 1976 (1976
Act).28 The 1976 Act empowers the President to establish and maintain a
regular information collection program with respect to foreign investment
in the United States and U.S. investment abroad.29 Because of the poten-
tially deleterious consequences of disclosure of the sources of foreign in-
vestment, several investors have sought to avoid the reporting require-
ments, and a strengthening of reporting regulations has been advocated. 30
111, 112-13 (1974-75). For an analysis of this proposed legislation and a history of federal
laws implementing U.S. policy, see Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory
Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 174
(1974).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) (original version at Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974)).
The legislative history of Pub. L. No. 93-479 indicates that the purpose of the study is to
"increase the understanding of the implications of [foreign direct and portfolio] investments
both within the U.S. Government and among the public at large, and thus to help to lay the
foundation for a national policy concerning foreign investments in the United States." 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5957.
24 See DEP'T OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 10; see also TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
REPORT TO CONORESS ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
25 See DEP'T OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 10, vol. 1, at 233-40 (at that time, total
foreign direct investment totalled only 3.5 percent of non resident gross private fixed invest-
ment); see also Rose, Special U.S. Rules Directly Affecting Foreign Investment, 1982 DICK.
INT'L L. ANN. 59.
2" Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20, 263 (1975), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
27 Id.
28 Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-08 (1982)).
29 Id. § 3103.
20 Note, International Investment Survey Act: The High Cost of Knowledge, 14 LAW &
[Vol. 7:61
6
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 7 [1984], Iss. , Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol7/iss/5
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW
III. RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
In the period from 1965 to 1982 alone, foreign direct investment in
the United States increased by more than 1000 percent. From 1970 to
1982, the United States attracted $86 billion in new foreign direct invest-
ment, compared to $13 billion from 1789 to 1970.1
In 1982, the foreign direct investment position in the United States
increased 13 percent to $101.8 billion, compared with a record 32 percent
increase in 1981.32 Although the rate of increase declined, it was only
moderately smaller than the increases in 1980 and 1981 ($13.9 and $12.0
billion respectively) and larger than those in any year before 1979. 3 Be-
tween 1976 and 1981, foreign direct investment flows into the United
States have increased significantly, not only in absolute amounts, but rel-
ative to U.S. direct investment abroad. In 1981 and 1982, inward foreign
direct investment was $24.2 billion more than outward direct
investment.34
Although these 1982 figures are lower than 1981 due to high borrow-
ing costs and depressed corporate earnings, the 1982 figures continue to
reflect the most current trend toward significant levels of foreign direct
investment in the United States which began in 1978, growing at an aver-
age of 25 percent each year until 1982.11
The reason for this surge in foreign direct investment in the United
States has been well documented.36 Despite fluctuations in the relative
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 481, 493 (1982). The Note concludes that any such toughening would bring
the Department of Commerce's reporting requirement enforcement efforts in conflict with
the statutory caveat that the information-gathering process have a "minimum burden on
business" and not deter foreign direct investment.
3' Fry, Foreign Investment in the United States and Canada: The Setting, in FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGULATION IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (Fry & Radebaugh eds. 1983);
Protti, Foreign Investments in the United States, 1976-1980: A Selected Bibliography, 17
STAN. J. INT'L L. 83 (1981).
32 Chung & Fouch, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States in 1982, 63 SURV.
CURRENT Bus., No. 8, at 31 (Aug. 1983). The increase in the position was less in 1982 than in
1981 because capital inflows were smaller-10.4 billion compared with $22 billion.
33 Id. The decline in capital inflows reflected sluggish economic conditions in the
United States, high domestic and foreign interest rates and the strengthening of the U.S.
dollar vis-h-vis other major currencies.
34 Bale, supra note 9, at 31.
35 The net international investment position increased $12.2 billion in 1982, compared
with $35.8 billion in 1981. See Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United
States in 1982, 63 SURv. CURRENT Bus., No. 8, at 42 (Aug. 1983); see also Benli, U.S. Enter-
prises Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors in 1982, id., No. 6, at 27;
Whichard, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1982, id. at 14.
11 H.R. Rep. No. 1216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1980). For an earlier analysis of the
decision-making process for foreign direct investments in the United States, see J. DANIELS,
RECENT FOREIGN DIRECT MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTERVIEw
STUDY OF THE DECISION PROCESS (1971); see also INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT.
THE DUSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (D. Wallace ed. 1974).
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value of the U.S. dollar and in the strength of the U.S. stock and real
estate markets, the United States remains attractive to foreign investors
because of its unparalleled economic and political stability, the size and
homogeneity of its domestic markets, its raw materials and technological
advances.
A. U.S. Legislative Response Before 1981
Subsequent concerns in particular economic sectors have resulted in
legislation such as the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of
197837 which requires foreign persons acquiring or transferring any inter-
est, other than a security interest, in agricultural land to report the trans-
action to the Agriculture Department. Concern over the level of foreign
banking activity in the United States led to the enactment of the Interna-
tional Banking Act38 which amends section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve
Act 39 to require, inter alia, that any foreign bank operating in the United
States be subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956. Disclosure of citizenship and residence by beneficial owners of five
percent or more of the equity securities of U.S. issuers under section
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"0 was added by the Domestic
and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977.41 Other disclos-
ure statutes include the Department of Energy Organization Act42 and
the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1980."4 Laws of broader
application such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 4 restrict im-
munity in commercial transactions.
Finally, several state laws prohibit or regulate alien ownership.45 For
example, section 202 of the Delaware Corporation Law permits Delaware
corporations to restrict the transfer of their securities to designated per-
sons or classes of persons with certain limitations.46 Notwithstanding this
regulatory matrix, however, the level of foreign investment in the United
States has continued to rise to unprecedented levels.
37 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
31 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982); see Herzel & Rosenberg, Foreign Acquisitions of United
States Banks, 15 INT'L LAW. 367 (1981); Note, International Banking Act of 1978: Federal
Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 145 (1978).
3, 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982).
40 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
41 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982) (Title i), (Title I is The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977).
42 42 U.S.C. § 7101 (1976) (requires a summary of activities of foreign-owned energy
firms).
43 31 U.S.C. § 67 (1976) (authorizes the gathering, analyzing and disseminating of sta-
tistical information including foreign investment).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
41 See Bale, supra note 9, at 45-46.
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (1975). For an analysis, see Finkelstein, Stock Trans-
fer Restrictions upon Alien Ownership Under Section 202 of the Delaware Corporation
Law, 38 Bus. LAw. 573 (1983).
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IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 97TH AND 98TH CONGRESSES
The theme of legislative proposals receiving support from the Admin-
istration in the last two sessions of Congress is "reciprocity." The term
"reciprocity" has evolved to mean that U.S. trading partners should ac-
cord American goods, services and investments the same treatment that
their goods, services and investments receive in U.S. markets. Although
this application of a trade term to an investment situation is well beyond
traditional trading rules,' 7 at least three sets of hearings by subcommit-
tees of the House of Representatives and Senate have been held on the
issue.48 Reciprocity legislation would counter allegations that the open-
door policy unfairly allows foreign investors access to U.S. markets that
are not so readily available to U.S. investors abroad. This concept also is
consistent with the Administration's objective of encouraging a reduction
in investment barriers. The paradox, however, is that reciprocity will only
be successful to the extent that the level of foreign investment in the
United States is large enough that foreign investors will pressure their
own governments to remove investment restrictions to U.S. investors.
Thus, the reciprocity concept will have little or no effect on countries
with restrictive barriers which have little or no investment in the United
States or on those countries which consider the domestic regulation of
foreign investors to be more important than foreign regulation of their
investors. The fallacy is that reciprocity legislation would affect those
countries which have imposed restrictions to limit foreign domination of
their economies and which are least likely to be concerned about U.S.
regulation of foreign investment. If reciprocity affects countries with pro-
hibitive investment regulations, it is likely to have exactly the opposite of
the intended effect, i.e., an increase rather than decrease in investment
barriers. Additionally, reciprocity will do nothing to relieve the poten-
tially adverse effects of foreign investment in the United States.
Although some of the other legislative proposals were directed at re-
,7 Hay & Suzenko, U.S. Policy and Reciprocity, 16 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 471 (1982); see
also Gadbaw, Reciprocity and its Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 691 (1982).
', Reciprocal Trade and Market Access Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d. Seass. 1 (1982) (testimony
on H.R. 5383, 5596, 6433, 6773 and 5205); Legislation Authorizing International Trade Ne-
gotiations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d. Seas. 1 (1982) (testimony on H.R.
6773 and 5519); Oversight of U.S. Trade Policy: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance and the Subcomm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981). See also Reciprocity in Invest-
ment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1980) (testimony on
H.R. 7791 and 7750 which sought to extend the principle of trade reciprocity to investment
reciprocity, see infra note 49).
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stricting certain forms of foreign investment altogether,4 9 most Congres-
sional committee activities centered on bills which proposed to regulate
stock margin requirements.50 None of the referenced bills were, however,
ever enacted.
Among the proposals submitted by the Government Operations Sub-
committee Chairman, Representative Rosenthal, was a proposal for an
agency with discretionary authority to prohibit or restrain foreign invest-
ment when it determines that a foreign investment is adverse to U.S. na-
tional interests.' Based upon available information, others considered
such a proposal counterproductive, 52 but it foreshadowed other legislative
initiatives in the 98th Congress.
'9 Bills such as H.R. 7791, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to provide that a person who is a citizen of or is incorporated in a foreign
country may acquire certain amounts of U.S. securities only to the extent that the laws of
such foreign country are no more restrictive with respect to the acquisition of comparable
amounts of foreign securities by a person who is a citizen of or is incorporated in the United
States) and H.R. 7750, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to make it unlawful for a foreign corporation to acquire certain ownership interests in
U.S. securities unless the country in which such corporation is incorporated permits the
acquisition of similar ownership interest in foreign securities by U.S. companies) are two
examples of such reciprocal legislation which focus on and would tend to perpetuate retalia-
tion by creating an administrative nightmare, requiring enforcement of different sets of
rules for investors from different countries. See also Reciprocity in Investment: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 101 (1980).
1o E.g., H.R. 4145, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to provide uniform margin requirements in transactions involving the acquisition of
securities of certain U.S. corporations by non-United States persons where such acquisition
is financed by non-United States lenders); see Acquisition of U.S. Companies by Foreign
Nationals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5
(1981); H.R. 1294, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to apply margin restrictions to foreign credit transactions in connection with acqui-
sitions of U.S. securities); H.R. 287, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to make the margin re-
quirements applicable to foreign borrowers rather than foreign lenders); H.R. REP. No. 258,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6 (1981), which was introduced as a revised bill following subcom-
mittee hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 59 (instructing the SEC and DOC to conduct a study of
the impact of foreign investment on the U.S. economy and U.S. securities markets); see also
Herzel & Rosenberg, Foreign Bank Loans to Finance Tender Offers for U.S. Companies, 62
CHI. B. REc. 80, 91 (Sept. 1980); S. 1429, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 to make the margin requirements for domestic purchasers of
securities applicable to foreign purchasers of securities in certain significant transactions
involving the U.S. securities markets and to impose a nine-month moratorium on major
acquisitions by Canadian companies of U.S. energy companies); Extension of Margin Re-
quirements to Foreign Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981); S. 1436,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Securities Pxchange Act of 1934 to provide uni-
form margin requirements in transactions involving the acquisition of securities of certain
U.S. corporations by foreign persons where such acquisition is financed by a foreign lender).
"' See infra note 65, at 10.
52 Id. at 43.
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In the 98th Congress, bills again were proposed to ensure reciprocal
trade opportunities,5 3 to provide uniform margin requirements5 and to
restrict certain foreign investments. 5 Two separate legislative proposals,
however, merit special attention. The first is H.R. 600,56 which would be
known as the Foreign Investment Reorganization Act of 1983. Subsection
2(a) chronicles the basis for the Bill:
The Congress finds that -
(1) Federal efforts to monitor, analyze, and report on foreign invest-
ment in the United States and its impact on United States national in-
terests are inadequate and ineffective;
(2) The activities of eighteen separate Federal agencies and entities
with responsibility for monitoring, policy analysis, promotion, or regula-
tion with respect to foreign investment in the United States lack coordi-
nation and consistency;
(3) Existing Federal statutory and Executive order restrictions on
foreign acquisitions in certain industry sectors are piecemeal and hap-
hazard, and do not protect the United States in many vital and strategic
national interest sectors of our economy;
(4) United States national interests are becoming dangerously vul-
nerable to foreign governmental and private investors in certain sectors
of our economy as a result of rapidly increasing foreign acquisitions of
United States enterprises, assets, and resources; and this has resulted in
(A) more and more decisions about the United States economy being
made outside the United States; (B) the unintended transfer of sensitive
high technology and research capability; (C) the export of finite natural
resources; (D) reduced international competition; and (E) increased ac-
quisitions of healthy United States companies rather than the creation of
new manufacturing facilities and new jobs; and
(5) Present Federal policy fails to distinguish between beneficial and
harmful acquisitions.6
H.R. 600 would establish an independent regulatory commission
53 H.R. 1974, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to ensure
reciprocal trade opportunities, and for other purposes); H.R. 1571, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1982) (to ensure the continued expansion of reciprocal market opportunities in trade, ser-
vices and investment for the United States, and for other purposes).
"' H.R. 2371, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide uniform margin requirements in transactions involving the acquisition of
securities of certain U.S. corporations by non-United States lenders, to specify a private
right of action for violations of margin requirements and for certain other purposes).
5 H.R. 942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to restrict persons who are not citizens of the United States from acquiring more than 35
percent of the non-voting securities or more than 5 percent of the voting securities of any
issuer whose securities are registered under such Act, and for other purposes).
56 H.R. 600, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to reorganize, consolidate, and expand Federal
monitoring, analysis, reporting and policy functions with respect to foreign acquisitions of
U.S. businesses and assets in vital and sensitive national interest sectors of the U.S. econ-
omy and for other purpoges).
57 Id. § 2(a).
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which would be responsible for monitoring, evaluating, analyzing and re-
porting on the nature, extent and impact of foreign investment in the
United States as well as the policy formulation and implementation func-
tions of CFIUS and the United States Trade Representative. 8 The Com-
mission would also be responsible for prohibitions of, and restrictions on,
investments by "foreign persons" (non-citizens or residents) in certain
national interest sectors and would monitor the behavior of foreign-
owned corporations. The Bill would prohibit any foreign person from ac-
quiring a "significant interest," (five percent of a public company, ten
percent of a private one), in any business enterprise in a "vital national
interest sector," (armaments, nuclear energy and weapons and telecom-
munications) or in a "sensitive national interest sector" (banking, trans-
portation, power, technology and certain natural resources), unless the
Commission has approved the acquisition. The standard for such ap-
proval is whether the net potential economic benefits justify the increased
degree of foreign control and outweigh the "potential or actual negative
economic and political consequences" resulting from the acquisition. The
Bill provides factors for the Commission to consider, including the net
benefits likely to accrue, and possible effects on national security, foreign
policy and competition. Time limits would be prescribed for Commission
determination. Confidential treatment could be obtained, and determina-
tions would be subject to judicial review except in vital interest sectors.
The Commission would have limited investigative and enforcement
authority.
Analogous legislation was proposed in H.R. 300,59 to be entitled the
Foreign Investment Control Act of 1983, which would establish a Na-
tional Foreign Investment Control Commission 0 with powers to prohibit
non-citizens from acquiring any voting security of an issuer substantially
involved in an area "essential" to national or economic security (e.g., nu-
clear energy, radioactive minerals or petrochemicals) or, in the Commis-
sion's determination, "important" to such security (e.g., steel, drugs, radio
or television) if such non-citizens possess effective control of the issuer.
The Commission would determine and publish the names of all issuers
68 The need for a coordinating agency to compile and disclose information on foreign
investment in the United States was documented in COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DATA COLLEC-
TION ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1975).
I9 H.R. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to establish a National Foreign Investment
Control Commission to prohibit or restrict foreign ownership control or management con-
trol, through direct purchase, in whole or in part; from acquiring securities of certain domes-
tic issuers of securities, by merger, tender offer, or any other means; control of certain do-
mestic corporations or industries, real estate, or other natural resources deemed to be vital
to the economic security and national defense of the United States).
60 A companion bill, H.R. 318, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would create a Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Foreign Investment Control in the United States which would
study the manner in which the National Foreign Investment Control Commission fulfills its
purposes.
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substantially involved in essential and important areas who would there-
upon submit the names and nationalities of all non-citizens who own vot-
ing securities thereof. The Commissioner would monitor the sales of se-
curities of such issuers on a daily basis.
H.R. 300, if enacted, would create massive intrusion of government
into the marketplace and raise questions about enforceability. The pro-
posed bill shares a fundamental flaw of the reciprocity proposals in that it
differentiates solely on the basis of alienage, rather than the merits of the
particular investment. While reciprocity would treat otherwise identical
investments from different countries differently, H.R. 300 would treat all
investors and investments alike, even where such investment is beneficial
or even essential to development of the American economy.
In Canada, however, existing legislation does not judge foreign in-
vestment only on the basis of alienage. The advantage of Canada's For-
eign Investment Review Act (FIRA)6 1 is that it is not intended to discour-
age foreign investment, but only to assure that such investment will be
beneficial to Canada. The initial reaction to FIRA concerned not the
principle of regulation but the uncertainty and non-reviewability of the
investment procedures, the broad scope of investment review, the lack of
enunciated policy guidelines, the vagueness of the significant benefit stan-
dard, and administrative delays in obtaining investment approval. As
noted previously, the administration of the FIRA has attempted to bal-
ance the quest for a national identity through a repatriation of control of
the means of production against the realization of the potential benefits
of foreign investment. By screening all foreign investment proposals with
only limited exceptions, however, the Foreign Investment Review Agency
precipitated an administrative quagmire. It has been suggested that FIRA
and its regulations be amended to raise the thresholds of the review pro-
cedure significantly, eliminate the review of indirect acquisitions,62 render
applications, interventions and reasons for decisions public and create an
administrative tribunal to decide investment approvals, leaving the Cabi-
net of the Canadian government to formulate directions of policy. 3
In the United States, H.R. 600 eliminates thresholds in favor of limi-
tations in vital and important national interest sectors. It would have no
direct extraterritorial application, is a public process (except when confi-
dentiality is appropriate), and it provides for judicial review (except in
61 Can. Stat., ch. 46, § 2 (1973-74).
62 See generally infra note 100. For an analysis of Canadian law dealing with extraterri-
toriality, see Paterson, Do Unto Others: The Extraterritorial Reach of Regulatory Legisla-
tion in Canada, 5 CAN. Bus. L.J. 114 (1980-81).
"3 The Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, Notes for Remarks to Mercantile
Bank-Wilfrid Laurier University M.B.A. Seminar 3 (Nov. 6, 1981) (to transfer investment
decisions to an administrative tribunal would, of course, be replacing elected ministers re-
sponsive to public concern, with a bureaucracy). For a contrast of administrative agencies in
the United States and Canada, see Roman, Regulatory Law and Procedure, in THE REGULA-
TORY PROCESS IN CANADA (G. Doern ed. 1978).
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limited circumstances). It thus implements many of the suggested
changes to the FIRA procedure analyzed in this article. The Foreign In-
vestment Review Act, however, provides a more flexible standard in the
review procedure than the inflexible prohibitions in vital interest sectors
mandated by H.R. 600."1
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REVIEW MECHANISM
It is generally perceived that high levels of foreign direct investment
are not an unmixed blessing.6 5 While it is recognized that the inflow of
investment dollars creates employment and economic diversification and
affords the local economy access to levels of technology that would not
otherwise be available, not all investment involves such capital flows with
resulting enhanced employment, economic diversification and increased
tax revenues. Most foreign direct investment is not for the establishment
of new operations, but the acquisition of existing enterprises.", Most of
these acquisitions are accomplished by the use of domestic credit sources
of unsecured lines of foreign credit unaffected by, for example, U.S. mar-
gin limitations. When U.S. credit is used by foreigners, available sources
of productive capital are lessened and upward pressure is exerted upon
interest rates.6
One of the strongest reasons for inward investment into the United
States is access to U.S. technology. Exportation of U.S. technology clearly
affects America's long range competitive position. In addition, the cost of
inward foreign investment may entail the importation of foreign compo-
nents, the eventual repatriation of profits from that investment and the
See Note, Foreign Investment in United States Energy and Mining: Crossroads for
Policy, 8 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 237 (1982). The author concludes that Congress and American
business might profit from emulation of the Canadian model of balanced review.
'5 Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1982), during which Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Representative of the State of New
York, stated that the Government Operations Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Affairs had in part concluded:
Not all foreign investment benefits the American economy. Some foreign invest-
ments present a clear and present danger not only to the well-being of the U.S.
economy, but to the independence and integrity of our political processes and in-
stitutions. More and more decisions about our economy and our public policy are
being made by foreign governments, corporations and individuals.
66 In 1979, for example, more than 90 percent of total foreign investment in the United
States was in the form of acquisition of established businesses. U.S. Business Enterprises
Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors in 1979, 61 SuRv. CURRENT Bus., No. 1,
at 28, 36 (Jan. 1981).
67 The Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra note 2, Part 3, at 214; U.S.
TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT SuBcoMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. (Comm. Print 1973). The report concluded that multinational
corporations exert a large adverse influence on host-country balance of payments.
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consequential lessening of indigenous research, development and social
independence."8 This effect is already being felt; the United States is be-
ing outspent on civilian research and development by its major industrial
competitors such as Japan, France and West Germany. 9
Failure to react to significant levels of foreign direct investment in
particular sectors may result in international tensions when action is uni-
laterally taken. For example, unlike many other nations, 0 the United
States imposes few such regulations or limitations on its national resource
sector.7 1 As Canada's far-reaching National Energy Program has illus-
trated, 72 international hostility is easily generated when national priori-
ties dictate a repatriation of such economic sectors.
There is increasing evidence that the United States is becoming iso-
lated in its advocacy of free trade."s It has been argued that the world of
individual traders with large pools of capital that prevailed in the first
half of this century have been replaced by foreign-based corporations.
These corporations have altered the pattern and composition of interna-
tional trade through the spread of direct investment and licensing, and
present institutions are unable to cope with the problems arising from
international production and the emergence of multinational enter-
prises.7 4 One observer has stated: "Reduced to its simplest terms, there is
an inherent conflict between the objectives of the international corpora-
tion and the nation-state. '7 5
It has also been noted that the comparative economic advantage,
upon which the market forces theory is founded, will continue to erode
with the emergence of "planned capitalism.17  The development of state
6" See Ellis, United States Multinational Corporations, The Impact of Foreign Direct
Investment on United States Foreign Relations, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1973).
": The Need to Work Smarter, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 80.
70 King, Foreign Restrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27 (1973). For
a survey of worldwide investment policies including ownership restrictions, exchange con-
version restrictions, separation or remittance restrictions, employment restrictions and local
material content requirements, see Price Waterhouse, Investment Policies in Seventy-
Three Countries, Second Annual Survey (Nov. 18, 1983).
71 The Operations of Federal Agencies Hearing, supra note 2, Part 1, at 9.
72 See generally infra note 120.
73 Upsurge in Protectionism: Subsidies, Tariffs and "Voluntary" Agreements Erode
Free Trade, TIME, May 9, 1983, at 66.
74 Behrman, Sharing International Production Through the Multinational Enterprise
and Sector Integration, 4 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1972); see also S. RoSocK, K. SIM-
MONDS & J. ZWxcH, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 233-34 (1977).
75 Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervi-
sion of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 295 (1970).
76 For a discussion of the emergence of planned capitalism from competitive capitalism,
monopoly capitalism and welfare capitalism, see R. HEILBRONER, BEYOND BOOM AND CRASH
(1978); see also L. THURO, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1980). For an analysis of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act, see
Beck, Law and Policy in the Operation of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency, 45
SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 183 (1981), in which the author concludes:
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commercial enterprises (which have increased twelvefold between 1957
and 1976 to comprise 12 percent of the Fortune 500 companies)" raises
the prospect that foreign direct investment of significant proportions may
be used to achieve political ends. Some have advocated that direct invest-
ments by such "eco-invaders" be rejected under the economic equivalent
of the Monroe Doctrine as contrary to the "concept of the separation of
corporation and state. '78 It is, in any event, realistic to surmise that for-
eign investors controlled by, or having significant relationships with, for-
eign governmental entities may act in furtherance of objectives inconsis-
tent with U.S. national interests,79 and are more likely to do so than
profit motivated enterprises.
Economists such as Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich note that the
unprecedented growth of the U.S. economy in the post-war period was
founded on a benign international market in which other industrialized
nations were recovering from the devastation of war and rebuilding their
basic industrial and economic infrastructures. Low wage competition and
foreign government assistance in high-growth industries are creating an
unprecedented negative trade balance as the United States becomes pro-
gressively less competitive on a world-wide scale. Key sector regulation is
arguably ineffective to protect U.S. national interests.8 0 What is advo-
cated is a new industrial strategy,8" essentially, a re-thinking of the policy
assumptions underlying the contradiction of the advocacy of unimpeded
investment flows while yielding to special interest demands for subsidies
Modern governments have found it no longer effective to merely adopt an ob-
server's role at the periphery of the economy, or to attempt to counteract market
failures and dislocations by creating economic "floor" and "ceilings". In advanced
industrial societies a new style of regulation is emerging, a system of co-par-
ticipatory planning!
7 See generally D. LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE ENTERPRISES (1979). Lamont notes a qua-
drupling of sales by such enterprises every seven years and a doubling of assets every four.
After tracing how foreign governments through political and economic ties compete success-
fully in the open market, Lamont advocates passive intervention in the form of a foreign
investment review code, and active intervention through the establishment of competing
commercial state enterprises to achieve national economic purposes. See also E. ZUPNICK,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: COSTS AND BENEFITS (Headline Series, Foreign
Policy Association No. 249, 1980); U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS: WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?, Comptroller General's Report to Congress, Aug. 23, 1979,
at 33.
78 K. CROWE, AMERICA FOR SALE 266 (1978).
7 See ABA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 230-46, for an analysis of the application of the act
of state doctrine and sovereign immunity to foreign goverment investors; see also The Oper-
ations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra note 2, part 3, at 18, where Professor Cohen has
noted that foreign investments take several forms, but they all reduce to one common de-
nominator-a challenge to national sovereignty.
80 The Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra note 2, part 3, at 19.
81 1. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS: THE DECLINE AND RISE OF
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1982); see also R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983)
(an argument that government must forge a partnership with business and labor to meet
foreign competition).
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and import quotas. Senator Daniel Inouye has, for example, stated: "In-
creasingly... the question appears to be how a host country can maxi-
mize the benefits it can obtain from [foreign direct investment] while
minimizing any actual or potential drawbacks from such investment." 2
Bilateral investment treaties like those signed with Egypt and Pan-
ama, but which have not yet been ratified, provide broader protection
than Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties that typically do not
address the issues raised by unregulated foreign investment into the
United States. 3
Present U.S. policy incorrectly assumes that all foreign investment
benefits the national interest. It fails to properly distinguish between ben-
eficial and actually or potentially harmful forms of investment.8 4 This ar-
ticle proposes that an investment review mechanism modeled upon, but
modified as appropriate from, Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act
provides the necessary flexibility to deal with negative aspects of foreign
direct investment in the United States without unnecessary intrusion into
such investment and within the parameters of internationally accepted
investment principles."
VI. CANADIAN REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Canadian economic development, generated largely upon British
,2 Inouye, Political Implications of Foreign Investment in the United States, 27 MER-
cFR L. REV. 597 (1976).
88 Combs, U.S.-Egyptian Investment Treaty: Proto-type Treaties will Protect Invest-
ments Abroad, A.B.A. Bus. L. MEMO, July/Aug. 1983, at 6.
Representative Rosenthal concludes:
The present U.S. policy of indiscriminate neutrality assumes, I think incor-
rectly, that all foreign direct investment automatically benefits the Nation. It fails
to distinguish between investments which are beneficial and those which are actu-
ally or potentially harmful to the United States. It fails to recognize that some
foreign investment, particularly those by governments or foreign state enterprises,
may be motivated more by political than by profit considerations. It fails to recog-
nize that enormous political influences derives from ownership of U.S. enterprises
and U.S. natural resources. It fails to adequately recognize that in certain sensitive
sectors of the U.S. economy, such as defense, communications, natural resources,
high technology, banking, and perhaps others, foreign investment may seriously
jeopardize the U.S. national interests.
In short, U.S. laws and policies must begin to distinguish between foreign
investment that provides new venture capital, creates new jobs, rehabilitates older
cities, or enhances international relations and foreign investment that results in
the export of profits, jobs, taxes, and capital; that transfers high technology, that
permits control by a foreign government of scarce natural resources, that lessens
national or international competition for valuable products and services, or that
increases the ability of foreign governments to influence U.S. foreign and even
domestic policies.
Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 65, at 3.
88 E. FRY, FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A.: A THREAT TO AMERICAN SOCIETY 144-45
(1980).
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portfolio investment, shifted to primarily direct investment from the
United States after World War II. Approximately two-thirds of all foreign
investment in Canada now originates in the United States."8 Increasing
concern about the level and effects of such foreign direct investment and
its impact upon the quest for a Canadian national identity8 7 led to several
studies and Royal Commission Reports. " These studies and reports re-
sulted in the imposition of restrictions in certain "key sectors" of the Ca-
nadian economy.89 Requirements of nationality for directors and limita-
tions upon non-resident ownership of shares were imposed primarily
upon financial institutions.9 " Additionally, the Canadian government peri-
odically intervened in the acquisition activity of foreign enterprises. 91
Public concern over the effects of foreign investment resulted in a report,
known as the Gray Report,92 which advocated the establishment of a reg-
88 See FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, QUARTERLY STA-
TISTICS (Jan.-Mar. 1983); Statistical Tables, 6 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW 26 (Autumn
1982). For an excellent analysis of background, see Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign
Investment Control Experiment: The Law, the Context and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 76 (1975); see also Gherson, U.S. Investment in Canada, 3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT RE-
VIEW 11 (Spring 1980), for an outline of the shift from British portfolio investment to U.S.
direct investment.
8 Wahn, Toward Canadian Indentity-The Significance of Foreign Investment, 11
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 517 (1973).
88 HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DE-
FENSE, SPECIAL COMMITTEE RESPECTING CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS REPORT (1970); THE TASK
FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE
OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY REPORT (1968); THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND FINANCE
REPORT (1964); THE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON CANADA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (1957).
89 For a summary of this legislation, see FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY, POLICY
DIVISION, POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS BRANCH, SELECTED READINGS IN LAWS AND
REGULATIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA, AND EXTRACTS FROM PROVINCIAL
LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972); see also G.
GRANT, LAMENT FOR A NATION, THE DEFEAT OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM (1965); I. LUMSDEN,
CLOSE THE 49TH PARALLEL: THE AMERICANIZATION OF CANADA (1970); J. MEEKISON, CANADIAN
FEDERALISM: MYTH OR REALITY (1977); Hughes, Historical Outline of Foreign Investment
Policy in Canada, in A COMMENTARY ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT (1975).
89See, e.g., the Bank Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. B-1, §§ 10(4), 18(3), 20(2), 52-56 (1970);
the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 10, § 4 (1st Supp.
1970); the Loan Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. T-16, § 37 (1970).
91 In 1971, the federal government intervened to prevent the acquisition of Denison
Mines Limited and in 1972 that of Home Oil Company Limited; see, for an example of U.S.
intervention, Lees, Summary of New York Superintendent's Denial of Barclay's Acquisi-
tion of Long Island Trust Company, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1970);
see also Abdel-Malek & Sarkar, An Analysis of the Effects of Phase II Guidelines of the
Foreign Investment Review Act, 3 CAN. PUn. POL'Y 36 (1977); Koehler, Foreign Ownership
Policies in Canada: From Colony to National Again, 11 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 77 (1982);
Rothenberg, The Impact of Affluence: Restrictions on Foreign Investment in Canada, 9
AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 72 (1979).
92 H. GRAY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972); see Comment, The Cana-
dian Foreign Investment Review Act: Red, White and Gray, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1018
(1973); see also for an analysis of the role of the multinational corporation in shaping Cana-
dian Government policy toward foreign investment, McMillan, After the Gray Report: The
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ulatory body with authority to screen new foreign investments, takeovers
of Canadian-owned firms, licensing and franchising arrangements and the
expansion of existing foreign-controlled firms.9 3 The first legislative pro-
posal, the Foreign Takeover Review Act,9 4 died on the parliamentary or-
der paper. Bill C-132 was subsequently introduced and became the For-
eign Investment Review Act (FIRA).95 The Act presented a compromise
between those seeking economic integration with the United States and
those seeking an immediate and total halt to new foreign direct
investment.9 8
Summarized, FIRA provides a mechanism to screen certain invest-
ment proposals by "non-eligible persons"9 7 to determine which invest-
ments will be of "significant benefit" to Canada.98 FIRA applies to the
acquisition of control of a "Canadian business enterprise"9 9 or the estab-
lishment of a new business or expansion of an existing business in Canada
into an unrelated line of business by a non-eligible person or group that
includes a non-eligible person. 100 If a non-eligible person proposes such an
Tortuous Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy, 20 McGIL L.J. 213 (1974); M. Cahill,
Foreign Investment in Canada and the Foreign Investment Review Act (1977) (LL.M. The-
sis, Harvard University).
9 H. GRAY, supra note 92, at 449-517; see also M. LEVIN & C. SYLVESTER, FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP (1972); Beigie, Foreign Investment in Canada: The Shading is Gray, COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 23.
9, Bill C-201, 28th Parl., 4th Sess. (1972).
" Can. Stat., ch. 46 (1973-74). Bill C-132 was passed by the Canadian House of Com-
mons on Nov. 26, 1973, and passed by the Senate and received Royal Assent on Dec. 12,
1973. In hearings on Bill C-132 before the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs on June 5, 1973, the then Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce empha-
sized that the Bill was neither isolationist nor protectionist, that Canada recognized that
foreign direct investment often brings benefits to Canada, but that Canadian policy would
encourage new foreign controlled business to benefit Canada. For an analysis of the consti-
tutional validity of the Act, see Arnet, Canadian Regulation of Foreign Investment: The
Legal Parameters, 50 CAN. B. REV. 213 (1972). See also Murray, FIRA: Its Origin and Pur-
pose, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPEcTs OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 3 (1976).
" Howarth, Canadian Foreign Investment Review Policy, 1 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 11, 14
(1982).
'1 Non-eligible persons are defined in section 3(1) of FIRA to mean essentially those
who are neither citizens nor residents of Canada.
" See FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, BUSINESSMAN'S
GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AcT 9 (1974); P. HAYDEN & J. BURNS, THE REGU-
LATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1976); Grover, FIRA: In a Nutshell, in CURRENT
LEGAL AsPEcTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 10 (1976).
99 A Canadian Business Enterprise is defined in section 3(1) of FIRA to mean a busi-
ness carried on in Canada by a Canadian citizen or resident, or which is incorporated in
Canada and maintains at least one active place of business there; or any number of individ-
uals or corporations, or combinations thereof, as long as there is one individual or corpora-
tion as mentioned above who is in control or in position to control the conduct of the
business.
100 The Act also applies to indirect acquisitions, i.e., it is a reviewable transaction where
a non-eligible corporation acquires "control" of another non-eligible corporation with a Ca-
nadian subsidiary. See Spoliansky & Easton, Beware of Canadian Subsidiaries, 30 Bus.
1984]
19
Fisher: Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act as a Model for Foreign Inv
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1984
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
investment, an application must be made to the Foreign Investment Re-
view Agency (Agency) to establish that the proposal meets the "signifi-
cant benefit" standard. Although "significant benefit" is not defined, each
investment proposal is measured against the following factors:
(1) The effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and
nature of economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource
processing, on utilization of parts, components and services produced in
Canada, and on exports from Canada;
(2) The degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the
business enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in
Canada of which the business enterprise or new business forms or would
form a part;
(3) The effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity,
industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and
product variety in Canada;
(4) The effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition
within any industry or industries in Canada; and
(5) The compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with na-
tional industrial and economic policies, taking into consideration indus-
trial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the government or
legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the acqui-
sition or establishment. 101
Broad administrative and ministerial discretion regarding emphasis
placed upon any of these particular factors is contemplated. 10 2 In essence,
the foreign investor enters into negotiations with the Agency which, in
most cases, results in undertakings made by the investor to establish
compliance with these criteria.108
Although the original legislative proposal contemplated an indepen-
dent administrative tribunal,'0 4 (and, indeed this suggestion has been
subsequently made),10 5 decisions on foreign investment proposals are
LAw. 1053 (1975). The leading case on this issue is Dow Jones & Co. v. Attorney General of
Canada, 113 D.L.R.3d 395 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1980); Comment, Dow Jones & Co. v. Attor-
ney General of Canada, 14 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 505 (1982). For the application of the
Act to public procurement, see Hands, The Procurement of Public Contracts in Ca-
nada-The Foreign Investment Review Act as a Factor, INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT COM-
MIrTEE REPORT, May 1983, at 1.
101 Can Stat., ch 46, § 2(2) (1973-74).
102 See Hughes, supra note 89, at 61. For practical advice on formulating proposals, see
Tennier, Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
CANADA 459 (1983).
103 For practical advice, see Glover, FIRA: Practical Insights, in CURRENT LEGAL As-
PECTS OF DOING BusINEss IN CANADA 30 (1976); Stikeman, Investments in Canada by U.S.
Residents, 10 REAL PROP. PROns. & Ta. J. 699 (1975).
I" Grover, The Foreign Investment Review Act: Phase I, 1 CAN. Bus. L.J. 54, 82
(1975).
10 See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Finance,
Trade and Economic Affairs, House of Commons, Issue No. 54, at 8 (May 14, 1981).
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made to the Cabinet of the Canadian government. Proposals are submit-
ted by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce (Minister) who
acts with the assistance and advice of the Agency.106 FIRA imposes a time
limitation upon decisions with respect to investment proposals by grant-
ing the allowance for such proposals when 60 days have elapsed since re-
ceipt by the Agency of a notice of a proposed or actual investment.10 7
In addition to the venture capital exemption,108 a franchise exemp-
tion,1"9 an investment dealer exemption, 10 and two limited reorganization
exemptions,"1 there is a general statutory exemption in section 5(1). This
section does not apply to the acquisition of control of a crown corpora-
tion, a tax-exempt corporation, or a business enterprise with gross assets
of less than $250,000 and gross revenues of less than $3 million. 12
Remedies for failure to comply with FIRA include injunctions, orders
rendering transactions nugatory and orders requiring the fulfillment of
undertakings.11 3 There has, however, been little litigation regarding these
matters under FIRA.114
VII. U.S. REACTION TO FIRA AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
United States officials have been critical of perceived uncertainties as
to the scope and application of FIRA. Allegations have been made that
"significant benefit" is too vague a standard for approval of foreign in-
vestment proposals, and that FIRA permits virtually unfettered discre-
tion concerning the conditions under which foreign investment proposals
would be recommended for approval.11 5 Notwithstanding its advocacy of
the free flow of international investment funds and ongoing criticism con-
cerning Canadian foreign investment policies, the United States itself has
104 Canadian Bar Association, Brief to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce
on the Foreign Investment Review Act (Sept. 1981). The reaction of the Government was
set forth in FOREIGN INVESTMENT REViEW AGENCY RELEASE F-13 (Mar. 2, 1982). For a de-
tailed analysis of the Act, see also Donaldson & Jackson, The Foreign Investment Review
Act: An Analysis of the Legislation, 53 CAN. BAR REv. 171 (1975); Glover, Canada's Foreign
Investment Review Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 805 (1974).
107 Can. Stat., ch. 46, § 13(1) (1973-74). The Agency can easily avoid this limitation by
sending a notice requesting further "information" under § 11(1).
10s Id. § 3(3)(b)(iii).
109 Id. § 3(3)(b)(iv).
110 Id. § 3(3)(b)(ii).
" Id. § 3(3)(d-e). For an analysis of the exemption, see Donaldson & Jackson, supra
note 106, at 225-29.
112 Can. Stat., ch. 46, § 5(1) (1973-74).
113 Id. § 19.
114 Donaldson, Supplemental Notes to Foreign Investment Review and Canadianiza-
tion, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 9 (1983); Hayden & Burns, The Cana-
dian Foreign Investment Review Act, 21 PRAc. LAw. 55 (1975); Note, Canada's Foreign
Investment Review Act Revisited, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 175, 192 (1980).
11 See Johnson, Canadian Investment Policies and U.S. Responses, 82 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 32 (1982).
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recognized that screening foreign investment proposals is within the sov-
ereign prerogatives of the Canadian government, at least if effected in an
equitable and non-discriminatory manner.116 There is no evidence to indi-
cate that FIRA has been or is being used to discriminate among foreign
investors to the detriment of U.S. investors."
7
Although some have argued that FIRA has not damaged Canada's
international trade relationships," 8 Canada-U.S. relations over the issue
of foreign investment began to chill with the speech from the Throne
opening the 32nd session of Parliament in April 1980, in which a toughen-
ing of FIRA was proposed." 9 In an attempt to secure its energy supply
and increase Canadian participation in the Canadian petroleum industry
from 25 to 50 percent by 1990, Canada subsequently enacted the National
Energy Program.120 Subcommittees of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives held hearings on Canadian
energy policies 2 ' and issued a report condemning the National Energy
Program. 22 The United States reaction was strongly adverse and pressure
was brought to bear upon the Canadian government diplomatically 23 and
"' Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade and
the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
"' Canadian Foreign Investment Screening Procedures and the Role of Foreign In-
vestment in the Canadian Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American
Relationships of the Economic Joint Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1976) (statement by
John H. Rouge, Jr., Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
18 Note, supra note 114, at 198. There is no evidence that any country has retaliated
against Canada or Canadian investors as a result of its investment regulation.
119 In the Throne Speech, 32nd Pal., 1st Seass., Apr. 14, 1980, vol. 1, at 6, col. 1, Gov-
ernment intent was stated as follows:
The Foreign Investment Review Act will be amended to provide for performance
reviews of how large foreign firms are meeting the test of bringing substantial
benefits to Canada. As well, amendments will be introduced to ensure that major
acquisition proposals by foreign companies will be publicized prior to a govern-
ment decision of their acceptability. The government will assist Canadian compa-
nies wishing to repatriate assets or to bid for ownership or control of companies
subject to takeover offers by non-Canadians.
1I0 See White, Canada's National Energy Program: An Analysis, 4 CAN. L. NEwSLrET-
TER 9 (July 1983). For an outline of how the National Energy Program is to build a "world
competitive industrial sector," see H. Gray, The Budget and Industrial Development (Nov.
6, 1980) (notes for a Speech in the House of Commons during the Budget Debate). See also
Take NEP Complaint to Court U.S. Told, Financial Post, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 1; U.S.-
Canadian Diplomatic Meetings Inaugarated to Reduce NEP Friction, Toronto Globe &
Mail, Nov. 25, 1981, at B1, col. 3.
12 Impact of Canadian Investment and Energy Policies on U.S. Commerce: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1982).
12 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, IMPACT OF CANADIAN INVESTMENT AND ENERGY POLICIES ON U.S. COMMERCE, H.R.
Doc. No. 6809, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
12 See FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEw AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA RELEASE F-174
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in the media. 24 In response, the Canadian government shelved its plans
to amend FIRA. 125 Faced with a worsening economy, the Canadian gov-
ernment continued, however, to defend its foreign investment policies,"26
notwithstanding mounting pressure for change in some 53 "protectionist"
bills proposed to Congress. 21
The matter escalated when the United States filed a complaint under
Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).228
The complaint alleged that certain "trade-related aspects of FIRA," such
(Aug. 4, 1981) (exchange of letters between the Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and
Commerce and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce).
124 FIRA and Gray Invite Economic Disaster, ExEcuTivE, Nov. 1981, at 25; Tears in
the Cellophane Bordgr, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 28, 1981, at 21; Trudeau Firm on Curbing U.S.
Takeovers, CHEM WK., Oct. 7, 1981, at 21; Trudeau's Nationalism Spurs a Stern Response,
Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1981, at 44; The Undeclared War Between U.S. and Canada, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Sept. 21, 1981, at 65; Watt Criticizes Canadian Foreign Investment Poli-
cies, IN WASHINGTON, Fall 1981, at 1; OEC Chief Claims Nationalism Butchering Relations
with U.S., Toronto Globe & Mail, Oct. 29, 1981, at B4, col. 2; Why the U.S. is Putting the
Squeeze on Canada, Toronto Globe & Mail, Oct. 23, 1981, at 7, col. 1; U.S. Calls for
Changes in Canadian Investment Policies, Toronto Globe & Mail, Oct. 22, 1981, at 15, col.
1; No Crisis with U.S.-Trudeau, Hamilton Spectator, Sept. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Canada's
Policies Attacked by U.S., Toronto Globe & Mail, Sept. 23, 1981, at 1; Reagan and Trudeau
to Ponder Sour Ties Over Canada Energy, Investment Policies, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1981,
at 10, col. 1; Under the Gun but Not Gun Shy, Toronto Star, Aug. 30, 1981, at E3, col. 1;
How Reagan Might Lower the Boom on U.S., Toronto Star, Aug. 25, 1981, at B4, col. 1;
Gray to Strengthen FIRA Despite Possible Retaliation, Toronto Globe & Mail, Aug. 5,
1981, at B3, col. 1; Nationalism Turns Canadians Frosty to U.S. Investors, Washington
Post, June 28, 1981, at F1, col. 4; The Big Test in Bridging Canada's Gap with the U.S.,
Toronto Globe & Mail, Mar. 25, 1981, at 7, col. 2; Gray is Impatient to Unfold His National
Industry Blueprint, Toronto Star, Nov. 15, 1980, at B5, col. 1.
125 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT FOR CANADA IN THE 80's, at 13
(1981). The Government stated: "For the time being, no legislative action is intended on
these measures until progress on the major initiatives already undertaken by the govern-
ment have been assessed." For an analysis of the trend of foreign investment regulation in
Canada, see Collison, Have the Interventionists Lost Their Nerve?, CAN. Bus., Jan. 1982, at
31; Goodbye to Intervention: Ottawa's About Face, CAN. Bus. 31 (1982); Canada, Under
Fire From U.S., Shelves Plan to Add Curbs on Foreign Investment, Wall St. J., Sept. 25,
1981, at 38, col. 1.
"' See, e.g., the Honourable Marc LaLonde, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources
of Canada, Economic Nationalism in Canada: Fact and Fancy (Sept. 8, 1982) (remarks dur-
ing a panel discussion organized on the occasion of the IMF/IBRD Meetings, Toronto, On-
tario); Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs, Canadian House of Commons, Issue 57, at 23 (Jan. 26, 1981); Trade
Official Defends FIRA in Speech in U.S., Toronto Globe & Mail, Feb. 9, 1982, at B8, col. 4;
Speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Canadian Minister of External Affairs, to the
Center for Inter-American Affairs (Sept. 30, 1981).
27 Kirton, Canada and the United States: A More Distant Relationship, 79 CURR.
HIsT. 117 (1980); Smarten Up or Lose Out Industry Told, Toronto Star, Sept. 12, 1982, at
B1, col. 5; FIRA Complaints Grow as Economy Worsens, Hamilton Spectator, Sept. 10,
1982, at 9, col. 2.
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 267.
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as "requirements by the agency that foreign-owned companies buy mater-
ials in Canada or export certain products," violated Canada's GATT obli-
gations. 129 The panel finding rejected the complaint regarding export per-
formance. The panel, however, agreed that domestic sourcing
requirements violated Article III, which requires "national treatment" for
foreign traders in domestic markets." 3 0 Concerns over whether the
GATT, which regulates trade issues, is an appropriate vehicle to chal-
lenge foreign investment regulations which only affect trade,' 3' and the
ease with which the Agency can achieve a Canadian sourcing objective
without violating the national treatment requirement,"12 have diminished
the impact of the GATT panel finding, even if it had been ratified. 3 3
Rather than await a final ruling, recently Canada has accepted the panel
finding.34
Canada has, however, consistently maintained its right to regulate
foreign investments." 5 United States complaints have focused more on
the uncertainties and administrative delays of attaining approval of for-
eign investment proposals than on the principle of investment regulation
itself. FIRA was born at a time when nationalist sentiments ran high in
Canada. Changed economic circumstances and national priorities have led
to personnel and administrative changes."36 Thresholds for review under
121 GATT Awaits U.S. Talks with Canada, Toronto Globe & Mail, Feb. 19, 1982, at
B14, col. 3; U.S. Views Demand of FIRA as Capricious, id., Jan. 20, 1982, at B2, col. 1; U.S.
Trade Complaint "Normal" Gray Insists, id., Jan. 9, 1982, at 1. For an analysis of enforce-
ment undertakings, see House of Commons Debates, Hansard at 7185 (Feb. 12, 1981).
130 FIRA Gets Slapped, Toronto Globe & Mail, July 14, 1983, at B2, col. 1; Canada
Broke Agreement on World Trade, Panel Says, id., July 13, 1983, at Al, col. 1; GATT
Panel Declares Canadian Investment Provision to be Illegal, Wall St. J., July 13, 1983, at
35, col. 1.
131 Partan & Herman, Canadian Foreign Investment Review: An Introduction, 1 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1982).
32 P. HAYDEN, J. BURNS & J. Fox, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA, REP. BULL. No. A-
10, 2135 (1983).
133 P. Hayden has pointed out that ratification would be hypocritical and unwise since
many other member nations of the GATT Council share Canada's concern with multina-
tionals which import parts and supplies even though such supplies are available at lower
prices in the host nation. Id. at 2134. For an analysis of the contingency protection measures
available to the United States under the 1974 and 1979 Trade Acts, see Lazar, Canadian
Industrial Strategy: A U.S. Impediment, 16 J.WoRLD TRADE L. 223 (1982).
134 Canada will Comply with GATT Report, HAYDEN & BURNS, supra note 98, REP.
BULL. A-15 at 1 (1984); Canada Eases Curbs on Foreign Investment, Financial Times, Feb.
7, 1984, at 5, col. 3; Who's Afraid of FIRA?, Toronto Globe & Mail, Feb. 6, 1984, at 6, col. 1;
GATT Report on FIRA is Generally Favourable, id., Jan. 21, 1984, at B19, col. 1; Canada to
Reword FIRA Act Before Final GATT Decision, id., Jan. 20, 1984, at B4, col. 1; Canada
Agrees to Accept GATT Finding on FIRA Bias, id., Jan. 19, 1984, at B14, col. 1.
"I' Alan MacEachen, Notes for a Statement made by the Secretary of State for Exter-
nal Affairs at the O.E.C.D. Ministerial Meeting in Paris (June 21, 1976).
' The Honourable Herb Gray, Minister responsible for the Act and generally per-
ceived as an economic nationalist, was replaced by the Honourable Edward Lumley, who is
seen to have a more favorable disposition to business concerns. Business May Soon Find
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expanded short form procedures were raised from $2 million and 100 em-
ployees to $5 million and 200 employees for new investment and direct
acquisitions and to $15 million and 600 employees for indirect acquisi-
tions,13 7 although there were discussions about amending FIRA,138 the
changes and clarifications that have been made in its administration have
effectively removed the bilateral tensions without compromise in princi-
ple.139 In the year 1982-83, the number of cases brought to decision in-
creased 66 percent over the previous year, and the inventory of outstand-
ing cases at the beginning of the year was reduced by 55 percent by year-
end. 1
40
In sum, U.S. antipathy toward Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Act has been directed to its administration rather than its governing pol-
icy.141 The hostile reaction to FIRA has been out of proportion to its eco-
nomic impact, reflecting economic circumstances and differing ideologies
between the Reagan Administration and the Trudeau Government. 142 Al-
though often misperceived, however, FIRA has achieved many of its origi-
nal objectives.1 4 3
There's a Lumley at the End of the Tunnel, Hamilton Spectator, Dec. 2, 1982, at B6, coL 1.
The Commissioner of the Agency, Mr. G. Howarth was replaced by Mr. E. Richardson.
FIRA's Chief will Soften Investor Rules, Toronto Globe & Mail, Nov. 29, 1982, at B1, col. 1.
Interpretation Notes and Information Circulars to clarify the Act were issued. See Fisher,
Foreign Investment Review Act Developments, 3 CAN. L. NEWSLETER 3 (Jan. 1983); FIRA
Clarifies Troublesome Clauses, Toronto Globe & Mail, Dec. 23, 1982, at B1, col. 1.
1,7 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REvmw AGENCY RELEASE F-40, Sept. 30, 1983.
138 Radical FIRA Changes Unlikely Despite New Conciliatory Tone, Financial Times,
Oct. 3, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Ottawa Quietly Debating Changes for FIRA, Toronto Globe &
Mail, Nov. 20, 1982, at 12, col. 2.
11' Faster-Acting FIRA Alters Way it Works, Financial Post, Oct. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 3;
FIRA Move Welcomed by U.S. Ambassador, Toronto Globe & Mail, Dec. 21, 1982, at B1l,
col. 1.
110 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REvIEw AGENCY, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1982-83).
141 See J. Marans, supra note 9, at 84.
142 B. Fisher, FIRA and the Canadian-American Relationship (Sept. 30, 1983) (paper
presented to the 7th Biennial Conference of the Association of Canadian Studies in the
United States). R. Donald Pollach in the Toronto Globe & Mail, Oct. 23, 1981, at 7, col. 1, in
an article entitled Why the U.S. is Putting the Squeeze on Canada concludes: "Indeed,
FIRA is a paradox: while internationally Canada may have one of the highest profile institu-
tions to regulate foreign investment, it may also have one of the weakest in terms of
impact."
1 4 Dewhirst, The Canadian Federal Government's Policy Towards Foreign Direct In-
vestment, in FOREIGN INvasTmENT REGULATION IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 27-28
(Fry & Radebaugh eds. 1983), states:
[W]hile the amount of foreign direct investment in the Canadian economy has
increased significantly, the level of foreign control of the Canadian economy has
declined in virtually all sectors. For all non-financial sectors the level of foreign
control declined from 37 percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 1980. In mining the
decline was from 62 percent to 34 percent; in oil and gas from 91 percent to 59
percent; in manufacturing from 54 percent to 43 percent.
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VIII. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SCREENING
MECHANISM IN THE UNITED STATES
The suggestion of a review mechanism was made in the Twentieth
Report by the Committee on Government Operations entitled The Ade-
quacy of the Federal Response to Foreign Investment in the United
States (Adequacy Report). 44 The Adequacy Report chronicles political
and economic costs of foreign investment 4 5 and cites particular con-
cerns.246 Federal statutory restrictions on foreign investments in specific
industry sectors are found, contrary to Administration testimony, to be
"piece-meal, haphazard and illogical." The policy of "neutrality with en-
couragement" is criticized as placing in jeopardy U.S. economic and polit-
ical interests because it fails to distinguish between beneficial and harm-
ful investments. The Adequacy Report concludes:
Most other industrialized countries recognize that effective monitoring,
analysis and supervision of [Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)] are essen-
tial elements of a comprehensive national economic policy; and that ways
can usually be found to minimize any harmful effects of foreign invest-
ments without excluding them. Accordingly, most countries require regis-
tration and prior approval of FDI and many place conditions on poten-
tially harmful investments to extract substantial benefits for their
economies. Evidence reviewed by the subcommittee indicates that (1)
current U.S. policy towards FDI in the United States is held hostage on
the mistaken assumption that this assures favorable treatment of U.S.
multinationals abroad, even though foreign governments regulate those
foreign investments to a much greater degree than we do, and (2) there is
little or no evidence that registration and screening requirements im-
pede foreign investment in those nations which impose such require-
144 H.R. REP. No. 1216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
145 The Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra note 2, part 3, at 18, states:
[T]he dangers of foreign investment take several forms, but they all reduce to one
common denominator-a challenge to national sovereignty. This is especially true
of direct foreign investment. National sovereignty means the ability of the host
country to shape its own independent policy objectives-economic, political, so-
cial. Direct investment by foreigners can challenge this sovereignty by potentially
circumventing or subverting national policies with respect to such vital issues as
employment, prices, regional development, market competition, research and de-
velopment, and foreign trade.
For example, if foreign investors are determined to give a preference to for-
eign over domestic supplies in purchasing raw materials or other inputs, the effec-
tiveness of national balance-of-payments policies intended to restrain the growth
of imports may be critically weakened ....
Decisions on relocation of activities within a multinational operation can have
critical impacts on employment levels or on the development of specific regions.
And, of course, a foreign investor, through privileged access to financing, R&D, or
distributional channels can potentially threaten the market viability of competing
indigenous enterprises lacking comparable advantages.
146 For example, the Report cites concern with the U.S. balance of payments and the
transfer of technology.
[Vol. 7:61
26
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 7 [1984], Iss. , Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol7/iss/5
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW
ments and where investment opportunities are otherwise favorable.
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that a changed U.S. policy will deter
most FDI in the United States. Investment will occur where money is to
be made, notwithstanding screening by host governments. 47
This suggestion counters a 1979 report by the Comptroller General of the
United States (1979 Report) that dealt specifically with the issue of
whether Canada's screening practices for foreign investment should be
used by the United States. 148 The 1979 Report concluded that there did
not appear to be any need "at this time" for establishing such a screening
agency. Three reasons were offered to support this conclusion. Firstly, a
screening agency would be inconsistent with long-standing U.S. policy to
encourage the free flow of trade and investment and to promote equal
treatment of domestic and foreign investors. This policy was formulated
when the United States clearly dominated international investment and
when inward investment into the United States was insignificant. The
U.S. regulatory matrix and investment limitations affecting foreign inves-
tors has seriously undermined the force of this position. In addition, the
changing nature of international economic relations and the emergence of
multinational and state-controlled corporations are changing the princi-
ples upon which such U.S. policy was formulated.
Secondly, the 1979 Report expressed the view that although the
United States is the world's second largest foreign investment host,149 Ca-
nada's reasons for creating a screening agency are more persuasive since
foreign investment is a much less significant factor in the U.S. economy
than Canada's economy. This argument too is losing its force as the net
inward investment position continues to increase. 150 Professor William S.
Barnes, of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, has argued that host coun-
tries can promote desirable types of foreign based or controlled private
enterprise only if an agency or mechanism is established to determine
which foreign investors are desirable. Professor Barnes argues plausibly
that the reasons leading Canada to enact its foreign investment review
mechanism could well be applied to other host countries even though
there is no equivalent level of foreign presence. 5'
Thirdly, the 1979 Report takes the position that the United States
has already established methods to monitor and control some foreign in-
vestment. The Adequacy Report examined such methods and concluded:
147 See Operations of Federal Agencies Hearings, supra note 2, at 22.
"0 Comptroller General of the United States, Report B-172255 (Sept. 6, 1979); see also
A FIRA for the U.S.?, ExEcuTrvE, Dec. 1980, at 44.
"I FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATIONS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (Fry &
Radebaugh eds. 1983).
150 See generally Bale, supra note 9, at 31.
151 Barnes, Foreign Investment In Canada and Mexico: An Agenda for Host Country
Screening, 1 B.C. INr'L & Comp. L.J. 1 (1977); see also Why Canada Gets the Attention,
EXECUTE, Dec. 1980, at 51.
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"Federal efforts to monitor foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S.
and its impact on America's national interests are so inadequate, dis-
jointed and poorly implemented that Federal estimates of the total
amount of FDI constitute little more than guesswork."'
In December 1980, the Department of Treasury issued the Adminis-
tration's responses to recommendations made in the Adequacy Report.
5 3
With respect to the recommendation for a screening mechanism, it was
stated:
The Administration opposes, as unnecessary and harmful to U.S. in-
terests, the creation of an agency to register or screen foreign investment
in the United States. Such an agency is unnecessary since the SEC and
the Commerce Department (as well as others) currently collect informa-
tion on all sizeable foreign investment. Therefore, very little additional
information would be obtained from registration. In addition, since the
CFIUS currently reviews investments with major implications for U.S.
national interests, there is no need for a screening procedure.
Moreover, the costs of setting up and operating an additional bu-
reaucracy could not be justified by any benefits that would accrue to the
United States. In fact, the establishment of such an agency would prove
harmful to U.S. interests.
Foreign investments in the United States would decline as foreigners
reassessed their views of the investment climate. Since they are generally
risking substantial assets over a prolonged period, any movement toward
restriction or screening would be interpreted negatively and increase the
element of risk involved in any investment decision.
Second, the establishment of such an agency by its very creation
would generate pressure for its use. This would make it likely that in-
vestment would be blocked or delayed for reasons unrelated to U.S. na-
tional interests.
Third, if we condone increased government intervention in foreign
investment decisions, there is a possibility that foreign governments
would react by taking actions harmful to the substantial U.S. invest-
ments abroad.
Fourth, the United States has taken the lead in promoting world
trade and an open world economy, both very much in its own interest.
To reverse our long-standing position on direct investment would be a
significant retrogression from the free trade principle, would undermine
our credibility, would remove pressure on other countries to move to-
wards free trade, and would retard progress towards an open world
economy. 5"
The Adequacy Report deals with each of these unsupported observa-
tions in detail. The proposed agency is said to be unnecessary because
information is already collected on sizeable foreign investments by a
5 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1216, supra note 144, at 19.
"5 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, ADEQUACY REPORT (Dec. 23, 1980).
154 Id.
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number of federal agencies. Both the Adequacy Report and H.R. 600 in-
dicate that federal data collection agencies are inadequate and duplica-
tive, that balanced and responsible views from the private sector are not
secured, that there is little inter-agency communication and that analyti-
cal efforts are almost non-existent.
The U.S. Administration further contends that, since CFIUS155 re-
views investments with major implications a screening procedure is un-
necessary. The Adequacy Report claims that CFIUS is a "dormant entity
run by Treasury to create the appearance of action in order to forestall
legislation." 156 The Treasury Department utilizes a pre-review process
which screens out investments from full committee review and thereby
minimizes the role of CFIUS. By directive, CFIUS excludes private in-
vestments, foreign state enterprise investments, and portfolio investments
from its review process, and foreign governments need only consult with
CFIUS if the investment is "significant enough, in the opinion of the for-
eign government," to merit consultation. The Adequacy Report claims
that no criteria have been issued to determine whether a foreign invest-
ment has major implications for the national interest, and that, absent a
national emergency under the International Economic Powers Act of
1976,157 the U.S. government would not be able to prevent or modify an
investment unless it were voluntarily withdrawn. These allegations cast
doubt upon Treasury's claim that, in light of CFIUS, no screening mecha-
nism is necessary.
The Treasury additionally asserts that the cost of the additional bu-
reaucracy would outweigh the benefits. Without definition or corrobora-
tion, Treasury asserts that such an agency would prove harmful to U.S.
interests. As H.R. 600 contemplates, the projected screening agency
would consolidate existing agencies. In light of recent shifts in interna-
tional economic concentrations and the emergence of state enterprises, a
screening mechanism requiring U.S. benefit from investment proposals
would assuredly justify its bureaucracy, in particular if the application of
the review reflects only investments impacting the national interest under
clear criteria.
The allegation that foreign investment in the United States would
decline if a screening mechanism were to be imposed for foreign direct
investment yields two responses. Firstly, the proposed screening agency
would pose no threat to an investment that projected economic benefit to
the United States. It would merely exclude those investments which
could not be shown to be of benefit to the United States if they were not
made. There is no indication that screening mechanisms reverse invest-
ment flows and the existence of controls in France, Canada and Japan has
not prevented major amounts of U.S. investments from being introduced
15 See Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 26.
"' See ADEQUACY REPORT, supra note 153, at 41; see also Bale, supra note 9, at 39.
167 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981).
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in those countries.'5 8 Secondly, Treasury asserts that reversal of the long-
standing U.S. position on foreign investment would remove pressure on
other countries to move toward free trade. This article has attempted to
demonstrate, however, that, despite its advocacy of the free trade doc-
trine, few nations are in concurrence in theory or in fact." 9
Two other arguments may be raised. One asserts that restrictions im-
posed on foreign investors that do not apply to domestic investors would
violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Consti-
tution. 6 0 Classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny."" The state must show compelling inter-
est which justifies unequal treatment. Non-resident aliens physically pre-
sent within the United States are probably also protected although there
is no unequivocal Supreme Court authority on the proposition.6 2 A
strong argument can be made, however, that non-resident aliens outside
the United States with no property interest in the United States are not
entitled to the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause.
6
,
3
Finally, it may be argued that a change in government policy would
contravene U.S. commitments under bilateral treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaties)16 4 or contravene U.S. obliga-
tions under various declarations of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD).' 65
Although most of the more recent FCN treaties contain express as-
surance on the right to acquire shares, they are subject to express excep-
tions for certain types of vital activities. 6 6 The national treatment princi-
ple may be further qualified by escape clauses and by the protocols that
accompany the treaties. 6 7 Older treaties would allow the United States to
regulate foreign investment. Additionally, most of such FCN treaties are
terminable upon one year's notice. 6 8
All of the major trading and investment parties of the United States
158 Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate
U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 551, 567 (1974).
159 See Note, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Possible Restrictions at
Home and a New Climate for American Investment Abroad, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 109 (1976).
180 Sardino v. Federal Res. Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966).
161 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1972); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
1682 See Darby, The Guarantees Accorded Foreign Investors, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 171
(1978).
183 Liebman & Levine, Foreign Investors and Equal Protection, 27 MERCER L. REV. 615
(1976).
"I' See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 43 MINN.
L. REV. 805 (1958).
'5 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as OECD, IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT].
188 Note, supra note 158, at 570.
167 Id. at 571.
18 Id. at 576.
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are members of the OECD, and all except Canada have adhered to the
Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements."6 9 This Code is not itself a
treaty, yet it is perceived to be binding upon the parties. There are, how-
ever, flexible qualifications including derogation for various "economic
and financial" reasons. 7
0
In sum, both the FCN treaties and OECD Codes provide some lati-
tude for a reversal of Administration policies. The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises provide greater breadth for policy changes.17 '
It should be noted that the OECD standard of national treatment only
applies once the foreign entity has established its investment. 7 2
IX. CONCLUSION
The United States' open door policy toward foreign direct invest-
ment fails to account for the potentially adverse effects of significant and
increasing levels of such investment. While regulated and controlled by a
host of U.S. laws, efforts to monitor foreign direct investment in the'
United States are duplicative and inadequate. Existing screening proce-
dures are narrow in scope and relatively ineffective in coping with the
modern evolution of multinational corporations and state commercial en-
terprises. As part of a new industrial strategy to deal with these develop-
ments, this article .has advocated the consideration of a centralized moni-
toring and screening agency, and proposes Canada's Foreign Investment
Review Act as a model. Legislative proposals which would minimize ad-
ministrative issues in the establishment and operation of such an agency
and corollary adjustments in policy have been suggested.
"' Id. at 577.
170 Id. at 579.
171 See OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note 165.
'72 See Bale, supra note 9, at 35; Canadian Foreign Investment Review: Questions and
Answers, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 33 (1982).
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